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The cost  of the federal farm program  is  always  a good subject  for
argument.  No one agrees on the component items that go into the cost,
much  less  on  its  magnitude.  Estimates  of  the  aggregate  cost,  both
direct  and  indirect,  range  all  the  way  from  astronomical  sums  well
in  excess  of  the  total  agricultural  appropriation  down  to  practically
nothing.
The  high  estimators  assess  a lot of  indirect  costs  against  the  pro-
gram,  some of which  are often difficult to justify.
The  low estimators  treat various  aspects  of  the program  as  an  in-
vestment  in  prosperity,  in  good  foreign  relations,  in better  nutrition,
or in anything  else they can  use  as  an excuse  to shift cost items  away
from  agriculture  to other  federal  programs.
The whole  program is so obviously tied up with political  and emo-
tional  considerations  that it  is  difficult  to formulate  any  kind  of  ra-
tional cost analysis that commands widespread  support.  However,  any
analysis  of costs must include such questions  as related benefits,  direct
and indirect costs and benefits,  current  and delayed costs  and benefits,
and  what  federal  programs  to include  in the  cost analysis.
WHAT  SHOULD  BE  INCLUDED?
Will costs be confined to such items as  price supports  on commod-
ities and the related Soil  Bank, particularly the acreage  reserve feature
of  it?  Or  will  we  also  include  such  things  as  agricultural  conserva-
tion payments,  Section  32 expenditures  for removal of  surplus perish-
able  commodities,  and  Section  32  expenditures  for  export  subsidy?'
Will we  go  further  and  include  the  cost  of  sales  of  surplus  com-
modities  for  foreign  currency  under  Public  Law  480,  realizing  that
those  commodities  were  already  paid  for  once  when  they  were  first
acquired  by  the  Commodity  Credit  Corporation?  Will  we  include
such things  as expenditures for Soil Conservation  Service, for Farmers
Home  Administration,  and  related  activities?
Will we  include  the  cost  of research  and  extension,  and the  regu-
latory  programs  in  agriculture?
And finally, to cite an item which has been very important in recent
years,  how  will we  handle the  cost  of food  and  fiber used  in  our vast
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against  agriculture  or  against  our  foreign  relations?
FIVE  TYPES  OF  COSTS  CONSIDERED  HERE
Our purpose here will  not be  to make  a  definite analysis  of dollar
costs. Rather  we shall  consider  the  question  of costs  or  effects  of the
program from  five different  points of view:
1.  Cash  outlay  by  the  federal  government  for  various  categories
of farm programs.
2.  Effect  of  price  stabilization  and  related  programs  on  produc-
tion efficiency.
3.  Effect  of  price  stabilization  and  related  programs  on  markets
for  farm  products,  both  domestic  and  foreign.
4.  Effect  of  CCC operations  on  domestic  marketing  institutions.
5.  Impact of these programs on our foreign relations.
Of  course,  other  approaches  can  logically  be  made  to this  ques-
tion. However,  any realistic  appraisal of cost must take into  considera-
tion  the  areas  listed  above.
DOLLAR  EXPENDITURES  FOR  THE  PROGRAM
The federal budget initially submitted to the Congress  for the  1958
fiscal  year  carried  a total  item  for  agriculture  slightly  in  excess  of  5
billion dollars.  This  was  a  record high figure.  Its magnitude  shocked
many people,  both  in  and  out  of Washington.
A  5 billion  dollar  appropriation  for  agriculture  averages  some-
thing  in  excess  of  $1,000  per  farm  unit  in  the  United  States.  It is
equivalent  to better than 40 percent  of total realized  net farm income
of  all  our  farmers  last  year.
Of  course,  not  all  of  this  represents  subsidy  in  the  usual  sense.
It includes  such things  as  loans  by the Farmers  Home Administration
and  the Rural  Electrification  Administration,  most  of  which  will  be
repaid.  It includes  100  million  dollars  for  the  national  school  lunch
program. It includes the continuing cost of research and extension,  and
the regulatory  activities  of  the Department.  It includes  the  Soil  Con-
servation  Service,  the  Forest  Service,  and  other  old-line  agencies  in
the Department.
But  even  after deducting  about everything  of that character  from
the  5  billion  dollar budget,  we  still  have upwards  of  3 billion  dollars
left  for  price  stabilization  and  related  activities.  It  is  rather  difficult
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conscious  public.
Indeed,  from  one  point  of  view,  it  is  not  always  too  logical  to
distinguish  between  the  costs  of price  and  income  subsidy  items  and
those  of old-line  activities  of  the  Department.  The plain truth  is  that
both add up to the total cost of the agricultural programs, from a dollar
point of view.  And it simply is  not too easy  to justify federal expendi-
tures  for  agriculture  that exceed  $1,000  per farm  unit or 40  percent
of  agriculture's  realized  net  income.
In recent  years  the  USDA  has compiled  estimates  of the  realized
cost  of agricultural  and  related  programs,  by function  or  purpose,  for
fiscal  years.  For the  25-year  period  from  1932  through  fiscal  1956,
the total estimated cost of programs  primarily for stabilization  of farm
prices  and  income  was  11.8  billion  dollars.
The  cost of these  programs  ran along  usually  under half  a billion
dollars  per  year,  and  never  exceeded  1 billion  dollars  per  year  until
the  years  1955  and  1956.  It reached  a  high  of  1.9  billion  dollars  in
1956.
The figures for  1957  are not yet available,  but when compiled will
probably  exceed  2.5  billion  dollars.  In  any  event,  1957  will  be  the
high year.  And  1958  will  probably  exceed  1957.
These  estimates  include  such  things  as  CCC  nonrecourse  loans,
purchase  and  payment  programs,  CCC  administrative  and  other
general  costs,  international  wheat  agreement  costs,  donation  of  com-
modities  to  other  nations,  commodities  sold  for  foreign  currencies
under  Title I of Public  Law 480,  payments  under the  Wool  Act  and
the  Sugar  Act,  Soil  Bank  acreage  reserve  payments,  and  acreage
allotment  payments under the old Agricultural  Conservation  program.
These  estimates  are  "realized  costs"  rather  than  total  costs.  For
example,  under  the  Sugar  Act  credit  is  allowed  for  tariff  revenues
collected  on sugar  imported into  this  country,  out of which payments
are  made  to  producers.  This  approach  means  that  over  the  25-year
period  the Sugar Act is credited with  a surplus of 347  million dollars.
Obviously,  it  can  be  argued  that  this  is  not  a  valid  accounting
procedure.  Payments  are  made  to  sugar  producers  out  of  revenues
available to the federal government.  The mere fact that those revenues
arose  from  tariff  on  imported  sugar  is  irrelevant  because  consumers
paid that tax just as  surely as  they paid their income taxes from which
other payments were made.
Likewise,  the  estimate  of  costs  for  commodities  sold  for  foreign
currencies  under  Title  I of  Public  Law  480  allows  credit  for  foreign
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The true  ultimate  value  of  those  currencies  remains  yet  to be  deter-
mined.  Very  few  people  believe  anything  approaching  full  value  will
be recovered  on that asset. Thus, it is easily apparent that the estimated
11.8  billion  dollar  cost  for  the price  stabilization  programs  over  the
25-year period  is  a minimum  figure.
The USDA  estimates  that this  11.8  billion dollars  was  divided as
follows:  Basic commodities  took  6.5  billion  dollars.  Designated  non-
basic commodities  took 2.3  billion  dollars. Other non-basic  commodi-
ties  took  2.4  billion dollars,  and other  costs  not allocable  by  specific
commodities  took  .6  billion  dollars.
The USDA  analysis  estimates  a  total  25-year  cost  of  5.5  billion
dollars  for  programs  primarily  for  conservation  of  resources.  This
includes  the  Agricultural  Conservation  program,  the  conservation
reserve  program  of the  Soil Bank,  the  Soil Conservation  Service pro-
grams,  the Forest  Service  programs,  and flood  prevention  and  water-
shed  protection.
How  much  of  this  5.5  billion  dollars  should  be  assessed  against
true  conservation  and  how  much  against  efforts  to  increase  current
farm  income  is  anybody's  guess.  Surely  some of  it went to both uses.
This is particularly true of the Agricultural  Conservation program pay-
ments,  which  totaled  4.1  billion  dollars  over  the  25-year  period.  In
most recent years  they have  been running  about 200  million  dollars.
The  realized  cost  over  the  25-year  period  for  credit  and  related
programs  for  electrification  and  telephone  facilities,  and  farm  pur-
chase,  maintenance,  operation,  and housing totaled  1.4 billion dollars.
The 25-year  cost for research  and  education,  including payments
to states  for the Extension Service,  was  1.5 billion dollars.
The 25-year  cost of  school  lunch,  marketing  services,  regulatory
crop  and  animal  disease  and  pest  control  activities  was  1.9  billion
dollars.
All  these  items  add  up  to a  25-year  cost of  22.5  billion  dollars.
This includes  the  years  from  1932  through  fiscal  1956.  Fiscal  1957
figures,  n6t yet  available,  will  no  doubt substantially  top  the record
figure  of  2.6  billion  for  the previous  year,  and  will probably  push  4
billion  dollars.
There  is  another  item  of  4.2  billion  dollars  which  represents  the
wartime  consumer  subsidies  on  agricultural  commodities.  It  may  be
argued  that this was  a  subsidy  to  consumers  and not  to farmers.  Be
that  as  it  may,  the  payment  really  went  to  farmers  and  came  from
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runs to 26.9 billion  dollars.
In anybody's  classification,  well  over  half  of this  sum  can  easily
be  classed  as  expenditures  primarily  for  stabilization  of  farm  prices
and  income.
How the rest  of it might be  classified  is  subject  to personal  inter-
pretation.  In  fiscal  1956,  for  example,  of  total  expenditures  in  agri-
culture of 2.6 billion dollars,  1.9 billion dollars or 73 percent went for
programs  primarily  for stabilization  of farm  prices  and incomes.  An-
other  217  million  dollars  went  for  ACP  payments,  a  large  share  of
which  was  used  primarily  for  income  stabilization  purposes.  This
means  that some  80 percent  of total  agricultural  appropriations  were
for income  stabilization  purposes.
EFFECT  ON  PRODUCTION  EFFICIENCY
Although  the  efficiency  of  agricultural  production,  as  measured
in total  output per man-hour  in agriculture,  has  more  than  doubled
in the last two decades, we must still face the question of whether pro-
duction  efficiency  might have  increased  even more  under  a  different
kind of federal farm program.
Some parts  of the farm  program  have  no  doubt  accelerated  pro-
duction  efficiency  in  agriculture.  For  example,  high-level  price  sup-
ports  have  been  associated  with  the  transfer  of  additional  cash  re-
sources  into  agriculture  and  the  incentive  to  increase  yields,  which
have  no doubt worked  in the direction  of increasing  output  per acre.
On the other hand,  the system  of  acreage  allotments  for our basic
crops has resulted  in production  quotas  so small that many producers
are  nearly forced  out of business.  A  cotton  farmer  with a  three-acre
allotment,  a  tobacco  farmer  with  his  one-half  acre  allotment,  or  a
wheat  farmer  with an  allotment  of  only  60  percent  of  what  he  for-
merly grew, finds it very difficult to be a low-unit-cost producer.
When  a  commodity  starts  being  produced  for  the  government
rather than for a growing market,  almost  inevitably a ceiling is  placed
on opportunity. When acreage  reductions are called for, the cut always
falls most  heavily  on  larger  producers  and  usually  on the  more  effi-
cient  producers.
This is especially true when federal programs take the path,  as they
inevitably  must,  of  product  diversion  from  the  commercial  market,
production  allotments,  marketing  quotas,  and  a  growing  maze  of
regulation and restriction over the operations of the individual farmer.
It then becomes difficult for the individual operator effectively to follow
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and technology  available  to him.
Consider  for  a moment  what production  allotments  are  doing  to
some  of our farmers.  The  rationing  of the  right to produce  to smaller
and  smaller  production  allotments  results  in  a large  number  of  rela-
tively  inefficient  production  units.  This  tends  to  raise  unit  product
costs  for  the  entire  output.  As  a  result,  important  sectors  of  agricul-
tural  production,  in  our most  scientific  and  mechanized  agriculture
in the world,  now find they are being undersold  in foreign markets  by
underdeveloped  areas  of the world.
The system of high supports we have been using for our basic crops
in  an  attempt  to eliminate  the  risk of  price  variation,  has  sacrificed
income stability. In other words, we are in danger of sacrificing  income
security for the  illusion  of price  security.
This  is a  cost agriculture  cannot afford  to carry.
EFFECT  ON  MARKETS  FOR  FARM  PRODUCTS
The adverse effect that our price-support programs, in and of them-
selves,  have  had  on  market  outlets  is  obvious  even  to  the  casual
observer.  This,  of  course,  is  well  supported by economic  analysis.
Production of our  basic commodities,  under the incentive  of  rela-
tively high price supports,  zoomed ahead of effective  demand,  and un-
precedented  surpluses  accumulated  in the hands of government.  These
surpluses  accumulated  partly  because  normal  markets  for  these  com-
modities  disappeared  at the  artificially  maintained  price  levels.
A couple of illustrations will suffice.  Price-support levels  for butter
were no doubt a very important contributing factor in the rapid  decline
in  per capita  utilization  of  butter  over  the last  decade  and  a  half.  It
can  be  argued,  of  course,  that  total  fat  consumption  in  this  country
was maintained with a shift from butter to vegetable fats.  But this shift
was largely induced by relative price differentials.  And once the market
for butter disappeared,  it has become almost impossible to recapture it.
Cotton affords another excellent illustration  of this same principle.
The maintenance  of relatively high prices for cotton in the  last several
years  has been a  tremendous  incentive  to the  production  of  synthetic
fibers,  both  at home  and  abroad.  More  than  that,  the production  of
cotton abroad increased tremendously under the umbrella of the United
States price-support  program.  This meant that we  lost a very  substan-
tial  share  of  our  foreign  market  for  cotton,  both  to  synthetic  fibers
and to foreign produced  cotton,  until we  began  a couple  of years ago
to sell CCC-owned  cotton  at a marked discount  in the world markets.
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culture  of  market  deterioration  under  our  price-support  programs,
but  they  definitely  have  served  to  impair  farm  incomes  more  than
would  otherwise  have been  the  case.
EFFECT  OF  CCC  OPERATIONS  ON  DOMESTIC
MARKETING  INSTITUTIONS
At the present time CCC has over 7 billion dollars invested in com-
modity  loans  and  stocks.  It  has  under  its  control  nearly  one  billion
bushels  of wheat,  over  one billion bushels  of corn,  and  some  six mil-
lion bales  of cotton. It is acquiring  and currently disposing of substan-
tial  quantities  of  butter,  cheese,  and  dried  skim  milk.  It  is  a  very
great factor  in  the rice market.
The  free  marketing  system will  be  in danger  if  government  price
manipulation continues  to grow.  The government  now has the power,
either  wittingly  or unwittingly,  to place  economic  pressure  on  whole
groups  of  producers  and  distributors.  Through  its  pricing  and  sales
programs,  the government  can shrink or expand consumption.  It can
squeeze consumers  out of  the  market or bring  in  new consumers.
A government heavily involved in commodity ownership can easily
by-pass  the  private  marketing  system.  Moreover,  as  the  government
becomes  more heavily involved  in the  commodity  business,  the public
pressure  for  this  type  of  activity  becomes  greater.  No  doubt  some
economies  would be attained by increased  government  activity  in this
area, but the threat to our private marketing system  is  increased every
time  government  widens  its  role  in the commodity  field.
IMPACT  ON  OUR  FOREIGN  RELATIONS
Foreign customers are very important to the American farmer. This
year, for example,  our agricultural  exports  will  reach  an all-time high
of about 4.7 billion dollars.  However,  about two-fifths of those exports
will have moved under governmental programs of one kind or another.
A  substantial  share  of  them  will  move  under  authorization  of  Public
Law  480  and  will  represent  a  "sale"  for  foreign  currency.  Another
major  share  will have  been transferred  abroad  under  authority of  the
Mutual  Security  program  or  relief  schemes  of  one  kind  or  another.
Some  will  go for  barter.
While  we have learned  in recent years  to use our  agricultural  sur-
pluses  as  a  positive  force  in  foreign  policy,  we  must  also  recognize
that every time we make a soft currency  sale or  a relief transfer, under
whatever  name you call it, it usually interferes  with the normal  export
market  of  some  friendly  foreign  nation  elsewhere  around  the  world.
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tries,  to  incite  food  riots,  or  to  unbalance  governmental  budgets
through  manipulation  of our surplus food  and fiber  disposal program.
This is not  a healthy situation.  Both our own governmental  people
in Washington  and  governmental  leaders  around  the  world  are  con-
cerned about it.  This  situation  is  particularly  serious  for those  nations
who  depend  on  agricultural  exports  for  a  major  share  of  their  total
foreign  exchange.
For  example,  the  export  of  another  half  million  bales  of  cotton,
more  or  less,  from  this  country  is  not  of  great  moment  to  us.  For
Egypt  or  for  Peru  that  amount  spells  economic  life  or  death.  The
export  of  ten million  pounds  of  butter  from  this  country  is  of  rela-
tively little importance  to  us. However,  if that displaces  a like  amount
sold from  New  Zealand,  for example,  it would  be  a major  economic
disaster.  Our wheat exports  during  the past year have  reached record
proportions.  They have  all been  subsidized.  This has  brought  rather
stiff protest  from  our  neighbor  to  the  north.  There  is  little  doubt  in
the minds  of many  people  that our wheat  export programs  were  one
factor in causing  a major upset  in the  recent Canadian  elections.
It would be  false  economy  for this country  to push  its  subsidized
agricultural  exports  to the  point that  we  alienate  some  of our friends
around the world  while at the same time we are spending some 35  bil-
lion  dollars  a year  in  a  major  defense  effort  to  keep  the  free  world
knitted  together.
Obviously  our farm  programs  are  now in foreign  relations  up  to
their ears. We cannot continue to pursue  domestic  farm programs  and
at  the  same  time  ignore  the  impact  they  have  on  our  total  foreign
relations.  Those  who  design  and  execute  our  agricultural  programs
must  assume some  sense of  responsibility  for the welfare  of our total
government,  including  our  foreign  relations.
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Experiences in
Public Policy Programs